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Constitutional Revolution in Japanese
Law, Society and Politics
LAWRENCE W. BEER
University of Colorado at Boulder, U.S.A.

MoDERN Japan has experienced two constitutional revolutions, one
from the latter half of the nineteenth century until I 945, and the other
since I945· By 'constitutional revolution' is meant a long process in
which a fundamental shift takes place in constitutional values diffused
throughout society by means of law, administrative actions, judicial
decisions, and education, both formal and informal.
Previous to these modern constitutional revolutions, neo-Confucianism, already well known and understood in I6oo, was adapted to
produce what might be called the Tokugawa constitutional revolution. 1
In contrast to this, the two modern constitutional revolutions were not
precipitated by the maturing of internal forces over a long period. They
were assimilative reactions to Western legal traditions. As a result,
contemporary Japanese law blends traditional elements with European
(especially German) civil law and legal theory, and Anglo-American
common law traditions.
In this article I offer some data and reflections on (I) prewar and
present Japanese constitutionalism and the revision debate; (2) legal
culture, embracing the legal system and values, as related to such issues
as freedom of expression; and (3) some pending problems in Japanese
constitutional law.

The Two Modern Constitutional Revolutions
Pre-I945 concepts of constitutionalism and law affect legal interpretation and debate today. Many leading judges, prosecutors, legal
1
David M. Earl, Emperor and Nation in Japan (Seattle: University ofW ashington Press,
1964); John Fairbank et al., A History of East Asian Civilization--East Asia: The Great
Tradition (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1g6o); and Dan Fenno Henderson, Conciliation and
Japanese Law: Tokugawa and Modern, 2 vols (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
1g68), vol. I.

(1)
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scholars and lawyers have had to straddle mentally two constitutional
eras, and received much of their formative training and experience
under the pre-I945 legal system. The Meiji constitutional revolution
(I868-I945) 2 institutionalized the system against which much of the
post-I945 constitutional system has been a reaction, but also laid the
foundation for aspects of the post- I 945 revolution.
Study of the law, administrative practice and police developments
affecting freedom of expression between I 868 and I 945 suggests that
most parts of a thorough system for restraining free speech had fallen
into place by I9I3 after piecemeal development, and that enforcement
of the Peace Preservation Law of I925 and subsequent related law
brought a final touch of unusual sophistication to the pre-I945 system of
control, for which the military were not as responsible as sometimes
assumed. 3 Neither the legal system nor traditional culture seems to have
honored individual rights, as rights came to be understood inJapanese
law under Western influence.
Rights and freedoms were quite new concepts in Meiji Japan.
However, the absence in Japan of a long and coherent tradition of
liberalism does not imply that the Meiji constitutional revolution did
not vastly expand pre-existing group tendencies to assertion for and
against policies in accord with their sense ofjustice and self-interest. 4 In
general, the maintenance of civil liberties in a country does not depend
on explicit emphasis in law or society upon rights and freedoms, as
understood in the law and intellectual traditions of the West, but on: (I)
a mixture of institutionalized values which taken together favor liberty;
(2) the existence of competitive, as opposed to authoritarian, politics; (3)
actual expression of agreement or dissent on substantive issues along
with the possibility of dissent with impunity; (4) such a balance of social
2

Dan Fenno Henderson, 'Law and Political Modernization in japan,' in Robert E.
Ward (ed.), Political Development in Modern Japan (Princeton: University Press, 1968);
and Hideo Tanaka (ed.), assisted by Malcolm D. H. Smith, The Japanese Legal System
(Toyko: University ofTokyo Press, 1976), pp. 194-253. For a concise historical analysis
of rights in the West, see Richard P. Claude, 'The Classical Model of Human Rights
Development,' in Richard P. Claude (ed.), Comparative Human Rights (Baltimore: johns
Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 6-so.
3
Yasuhiro Okudaira, Political Censorship in Japan, 1931-1945 (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Law School Library, 1962), esp. pp. 1-50.
4
Probably the most valuable compilation of detailed studies and official trial records
of group political actions in japan from the 186os till the Pacific War isSeiji saiban shiroku,
5 vols (Daiichi Hoki, 1969-70 ), edited by Daiichi Hoki publishing co. An additional five
volumes on recent decades were published in 1980. These studies amply illustrate
preferences for group, as opposed to individual, assertiveness, and for other traditional
values (referred to later in this paper) which antedated but are not integrated with
Western legal ideas of justice.
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and political forces that those favoring rights outweigh those opposed. 5
The sociological interplay of such factors in Japan from the 186os
through the 1930s resulted in a growing awareness of individual legal
rights, as understood today inJapanese and Western law, among many
scholars, officials and other citizens at the same time that a modern
system of political repression was being refined and increasingly
enforced in service to the Emperor.
The constitutional system ofJapan today, reflecting a quite different
interplay of factors, stresses enforcement of individual rights. The
present widespread acceptance of the constitution in Japan rests in part
on a continuing reaction against a prewar system that failed in the
mind-numbing defeat of the Second World War. It does not seem
probable that Japan would soon have become a constitutional democracy without the shock of losing the Pacific War and without massive
Occupation support for Japan's liberal forces. 6 Modern political
systems which are systematically authoritarian, whether left or right in
orientation and however inefficient in light of abstract goals, appear
much simpler to maintain as regimes than constitutional democracies.
Japan's authoritarian apparatus, by comparative standards, was
efficient in its methods of political control during the militarist period,
and not likely to evolve along more liberal lines.
The widespread, deep, and genuine loyalty to the emperor-nation of
that earlier era is not much discussed in public today, and is perhaps
remembered more often with embarrassment than with pride. The
rejection now of significant military power under the pacifist provisions
of Article 9 7 and the denial of power to the Emperor under Chapter 18 of
5

William Spinrad, Civil Liberties (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 5-26,
292-306. See Okudaira, Political Censorship in Japan; Richard Mitchell, Thought Control in
Prewar Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976); and Patricia Steinhoff, 'Legal
Control of Ideology in Prewar Japan,' unpublished paper, International Congress of
Orientalists, Canberra, Australia, 1970.
6
See Legal Reforms in Japan during the Allied Occupation, special reprint volume,
Washington Law Review, 1977.
7
'Article 9· Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,
the japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.
'2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency
of the state will not be recognized.' The Constitution of Japan, in Itoh and Beer, The
Constitutional Case Law of Japan (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978), p. 258.
According to Chalmers johnson, the japanese senryoku, the usual japanese translation of
war potential in paragraph 2 of Article g, is a mistranslation, as senryoku means fighting
power or strength, something more limited than war potential. The constitution does
not, therefore, limit senbi or gunbi which have the wider meaning implied in war
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the constitution seem intimatejy linked in theJ apanese mind to the utter
national failure resulting from total and militant loyalty to the Emperor.
Just as prewar children were programmatically indoctrinated in kokutai
ideology, so postwar children have been conditioned systematically to
believe in freedom ever since the first student was required to memorize
the new constitution during the Occupation (I 945-52). 9 The shock of
those who had believed unquestioningly in the invincibility of the nation
under the Emperor, although profound, is as difficult to convey to
today's youth as it is to make real to America's affluent youth the
depression years.
Closely associated in the collective memory of the 'militarist period' is
the severe, even irrational, limitation of the freedom of thought, the
freedom of expression, and other individual rights. The radical postwar
rejection by the overwhelming majority of the prewar military-bureaucratic system, which is seen as having misused the imperial institution for
its own ends, explains in part why efforts to alter notably the status of
Japan's Self-Defense Forces, or the Emperor, or individual rights are
perceived by many liberal and leftistjapanese as an attempt to rip apart
the entire fair fabric of the I 94 7 constitution, and not simply as an
attempt to modify one of its elements. Whether or not this perception
represents a persuasive assessment of relationships, the three parts are
commonly seen as crucial and inseparable; no other components of the
new constitutional structure arouse such noteworthy emotion. More
power to the Emperor would mean, it is thought, more power to the
military which would mean expanded police powers and less democratic
freedom; and conversely, strict limitation of imperial and military
functions in government is necessary to assure the maintenance and
development of constitutional rights. In sum, the term 'Peace Constitution' is used injapan as a reference to the anti-militarist provisions of the
constitution, its guarantee of individual rights, and imperial powerlessness.

potential, and which, owing to japan's industrial potential, is considerable. C. Johnson,
'Omote (Explicit) and Ura (Implicit): Translating japanese Political Terms,' Journal of
Japanese Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Winter 1980), p. 114.
8
'Article 4· The Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state as are
provided for in this Constitution and he shall not have powers related to government.'
Ibid., p. 257.
9
Lawrence W. Beer, 'Education, Politics and Freedom of Expression in japan: the
Ienaga Textbook Review Cases,' Law in Japan: An Annual, Vol. 8 (1975), 67-go; Ronald
Suleski, 'A New Generation ofjapanese Intellectuals,' Japan Foundation Newsletter, 6, No.
4 (October-November, 1978), pp. ID-12.
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The Revision Controversy

The Constitution of Japan has not been amended even once, as the
constitutional revolution of postwar Japan has continued to take root.
As it has been applied, it seems sufficiently flexible to remove any
pressing need for amendment. The Meiji Constitution was never
amended, unless the establishment of the present constitution is viewed
technically as a constitutional amendment. 10 The aspects of perception
described above seem a critical factor underlying the seriousness of
academic, legal and political debate on questions of constitutional
interpretation and revision over the past thirty years. A litmus test
applied to scholars and politicians, as well as to laws and judicial
decisions on many issues is how they relate to the tripartite revision issue.
So thoroughly integrated into political and legal rhetoric is this
constitutional sensitivity that court cases concerning a wide range of
subjects-for example, history textbook certification, academic freedom, demonstrations, the rating of teachers, and the Japan-United
States Security Treaty- have evoked references to all aspects of the
tripartite image of Emperor, military, and individual rights.
Once the Allied Occupation ended in I952, the revision controversy
gathered momentum and reached a peak during the mid- and
late-I950s following the formation of the Liberal-Democratic Party
(LDP) and the Japan Socialist Party USP) by coalitions of smaller
parties. Some powerful LDP leaders wanted revision precisely to
strengthen the positions of the Emperor and the military and to limit
individual rights; but this does not mean a widespread desire existed in
the LDP for a return to the political system of the wartime period from
the Manchurian Incident (I 93 I) till late I 945, during which period
bureaucrats and militarists decisively replaced elected party politicians
as top leaders of the government. 11
10

The Constitution of japan was promulgated on November 3, 1946 and went into
effect on May 3, 1947· The amendment provision in The Constitution of the Empire of
Japan was as follows: 'Article 73· When it has become necessary in future to amend the
provisions of the present Constitution, a project to the effect shall be submitted to the
Imperial Diet by Imperial Order.
'2. In the above case, neither House can open the debate, unless not less than
two-thirds of the whole number of Members are present, and no amendment can be
passed, unless a majority of not less than two-thirds of the Members present is obtained.'
Tanaka, Japanese Legal System, p. 23.
11 On the history of the revision controversy, see Haruhiro Fukui, 'The Liberal
Democratic Party and Constitutional Revision,' in David Sissons (ed.), Papers on Modern
Japan (Canberra: Australian University Press, 1968), and 'Twenty Years of Revi-
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At least six factors seem to have virtually eliminated the probability of
wholesale constitutional revision in Japan's near future, assuming no
severe economic upheaval:
(I) The Security Treaty Crisis of I 960 seems to have been more of a
community rite affirming consensual democracy than an anti-treaty or
revolutionary struggle. 12 It was the largest mass movement inJapanese
history, 13 and it may well have suggested to LDP leaders such as Prime
Minister Ikeda Hayato that an effort at major constitutional change,
whether needed or not, would awaken organized opposition on a much
grander scale than that of I 960.
(2) The Sunagawa Decision of the Supreme Court 14 spoke ofJapan's
natural right of self-defense and held Japan's cooperation and security
treaty with the United States to be constitutional under Article 9· This
decision may have reduced the revisionists' sense of urgency about
revision for the sake ofJapan's military security. The present Security
Treaty of I96o was similarly upheld by the Supreme Court on April 2,
I96g. 15 Two other aspects ofJapan's politics tend to support Article g's
anti-militarism and Article 66-2, a constitutional requirement that 'the
Prime Minister and other Ministers of State must be civilians.' First,
over 8o percent of the Japanese people support Article 9 and the
Security Treaty; 57 percent favor maintaining the Self-Defense Forces
at present levels, while only I9 percent support an increase in military
sionism,' in Dan Fenno Henderson (ed.), The Constitution of Japan: Its First Twenty rears
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969}, pp. 41-70; and Reinhard Neumann,
The lnaba Affair, Constitution Day and Constitutional Revision,' Law in Japan: An
Annual, Vol. 9 (1976}, pp. 129-43.
12
Max Gluckman's distinction between 'rituals of rebellion' and 'revolution' may
apply to the 196o Security Treaty Crisis and to some aspects of the University Crisis of
1969. Revolution seeks to overthrow the whole existing order, while ritual rebellion,
which may be a luxury limited to societies like Japan with a stable established order,
reaffirm the system in venting tensions between leaders and led and between viewpoints.
In this connection, see Max Gluckman, Custom and Conflict in Africa and Politics, Law, and
Ritual in Tribal Society; and Takeo Doi Uohn Bester, trans.), Anatomy of Dependence
(Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1973).
13
On the Security Treaty Crisis, see George R. Packard III, Protest in Tokyo: The
Security Treaty Crisis of IgOO (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Richard
Rabinowitz, 'Law and the Social Process inJapan,' The Transactions ofthe Asiatic Society of
Japan, Third Series, Vol. 10 ( 1968): 54-71 ;John M. Maki, Government and Politics in Japan
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962); Robert Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi,
Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1962).
14
Japan v. Sakata, 23 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, December 16, 1959). For a
translation, see John M. Maki (ed. }, Court and Constitution in Japan (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1964}, pp. 298-361.
15
Japanv. Sakaneetal., 13 Keishu (No.5) 685 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench,April2, 1969).
A translation appears in Itoh and Beer, Constitutional Case Law of Japan, pp. 103-30.
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strength; and very few Japanese exhibit a sense of external military
threat. 16 Most feel there are greater internal than external threats to the
system, and even internal threats are minimal. Second, Article 9 has
operated in such a way that the military has been removed from the
political drama, and, barring an unforeseeable crisis, this has negated
the possibility of a military coup d'etat in Japan. If Japan had a
conventional constitution, without Article 9, a strong military, whatever its political alignments, would have at its disposal the instruments of
coercion which,] apanese history suggests, it would not be reticent to use
politically.
(3) The issuance in I 964, under the leadership of Professor Takayanagi Kenzo, of a non-committal final report by the Commission on
the Constitution (I 95 7-64; Kenpo Chosakai) also discouraged further
revision efforts, at least for some time. No recommendations for
amendment were made after six years of hearings, study, and debate. 17
From its inception, many critics viewed the Commission as a revisionist
tool; if such was the original intent of the LDP, it was frustrated. Many
scholars and politicians refused to participate in or support the
Commission's activities. Whether their participation would have added
even greater force to the Commission's final refusal to recommend
changes is a moot point. In any case, many opponents of the
Commission were actively involved in parallel study groups, which
included Commission members, during the long debate over every
important and technical provision of the Constitution of Japan. In its
function, this debate may be viewed as a Japanese-style constitutional
convention, with long consultations at home and abroad, and widespread
debates in pursuit of national consensus. japan had had no opportunity
for such a 'convention' under the Occupation.
(4) In the late I 940s and early I 950s, food, clothing, and other basic
needs were the preoccupations of most, leaving a small minority to
16

See the opinion poll survey reports in Asahi Shinbun, November I, I978 and january
I, I979·
17
Kenz6 Takayanagi Oohn Maki, trans.), 'The Conceptual Background of the
Constitutional Revision Debate in the Constitution Investigation Commission,' Law in
Japan: An Annual, Vol. I ( I967): I-24; Robert E. Ward, 'The Commission on the
Constitution in the Prospects of Consti tu tiona! Change inj a pan,' Journal ofAsian Studies,
Vol. 24 ( I965): 401-3o;john M. Maki, 'The Documents ofjapan's Commission on the
Constitution,' Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 24 ( 1965): 475-89; and the final report of the
Commission on the Constitution, Kenpo Chosakai J-IOkokusho ( OkurashO/nsatsukyoku, I 964).
For commentaries, see J-IOritsu Jiho 419 (August, 1964): 363-74, and Jurisuto 303
(August, I964): Io-26. A study group, Kenpo Mondai Kenkyukai, opposing the
Commission on the Constitution, Kenpo Chosakai J-IOkokusho ( OkurashO/nsatsukyoku, I 964).
lwanami Shoten, I964).
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debate ideologies and constitutional ideas. The postwar revolution of
thought had a slow start. By far the most frequently cited reason in I 979
for Japan's peace since World War II was 'the personally experienced
misery of war,' 18 and popular support for the 'peace constitution' is
perhaps equally attributable to that experience, at least initially. The
fact is that popular assimilation and support for the constitution has
grown, and militates strongly against revision. This has been primarily
the result of education, accumulating experience of the operation of the
constitution, prosperity, the absence of any appealing alternative, the
work of the Commission on the Constitution, and the long-term absence
of a perceived external military threat.
(5) The LDP lost in the late I 96os and I 970s the overwhelming
parliamentary power necessary to revise the constitution. This, and
factional differences within the LDP render revision very unlikely.
Inside and outside the political parties, Japan has many power centers,
groups organized along relatively non-authoritarian, quasi-familial
lines. A few such centers seem dominant-such as the ruling political
party, the Ministries (especially the Finance Ministry), the judiciary,
mass media combines, and industry federations-with lesser interest
groups or domains filling out the system. In general, loyalty to the small
face-to-face group is primary, 19 and it is quite common for such groups
or factions to be in competition with, or at best indifferent to, the others.
But they can also freely enter into alliances of mutual benefit, usually for
limited periods and for particular purposes. This often happens, for
example, among factions of the LDP, and this capacity for making and
breaking alliances makes the system dynamic and highly organized. But
a consensus within the LDP to revise the constitution is certainly not
readily foreseeable, and cooperation with other political parties is much
more unlikely. The distribution of seats in the Diet remains fairly stable,
the LDP's capacity to retain control of the Diet being primarily due
to the absence of an alternative appealing to the voters. In July I98o,
even after an atypical LDP landslide victory, the LDP's 286 seats out
of 5 I I in the lower house and I 35 of 252 in the upper house 20 are far
18

Asahi Shinbun, November I, I978 and january I, I979·
Such loyalty is especially emphasized among white collar workers. See Sepp
Linhart, Arbeit, Frei;:.eit und Familie in Japan, with a summary in English (Weisbaden:
Otto Harrassowitz, I976), and Thomas Rohlen, For Harmony and Strength, Japanese
White-Collar Organization in Anthropological Perspective (Berkeley: University of California
Press, I 974).
•
20 The distribution of seats in both Houses of the Diet injuly I98o was as below. For
perspective, statistics after the prior two lower house elections and the last upper house
election are included. The sudden jump in LDP strength in I98o was attendant to the
19
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short of the two-thirds majority required to amend the constitution. 21
(6) Also militating against constitutional revision is the institutionalization of the Constitution ofjapan through law and judicial decisions.
The district, high and Supreme Courts of Japan have been much too
diverse in their ideological leanings and interpretive methods to allow
blanket characterizations of judicial performance since 194 7 with
respect to constitutional law. But the net cumulative effect of their work
in millions of cases, civil, criminal and administrative, has significantly
strengthened the roots of rule of law democracy in Japanese soil. 22 In
unexpected death of Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi on June 12 during the election
campaign. Voter turnout on June 22 was the highest since 1960, 74·57%, as citizens
rallied around the strongest party and, perhaps, honored the deceased by supporting his
party, especially candidates of factions allied with Ohira. See Asahi Shinbun,June 23-26,
1980.
House of
Representatives
Party
LDP
JSP
llomeito
Democratic Socialist Party
Japan Communist Party
New Liberal Club
Shaminren
Independents
Vacancies

House of
Councilors

1980 '979 1976 1980 1977
286 253 254 135 125
107 107 118
47
53
28
s8
s6
27
34
12
II
28
36
33
12
16
29
41
19
12
2
17
5
4
2
2
3
3
3
10
6
14
7
4
10
2
511

511

511

252

247

In the 1970s, independents usually joined with the LDP, thus assuring it a parliamentary majority. The New Liberal Club is a moderate conservative group which split off
from the LDP in the mid-1970s, but often votes with it.
21
The Constitution of Japan, Article 96:
'Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring
vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be
submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a
majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet
shall specify.
'2. Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the Emperor
in the name of the people, as an integral part of this Constitution.' ltoh and Beer,
Constitutional Cas! Law of Japan, p. 268.
22
Lawrence W. Beer, 'Nihon no saibankan,' Jurisuto, no. 700, September 15, '979·
Annually, HOso Jiho (Hosokai) publishes authoritative statistical reports on cases dealt
with by the courts, and HOritsu Jiho (Nihon Hyoronsha) carries reviews of both
constitutional case law and constitutional studies (kenpogaku). Although the Supreme
Court's share in the judicial caseload is only a small fraction of the whole, by the end of
1977, it had 'taken cognizance of 183,496 cases, out of which 1,045 cases were referred to
the Grand Bench [by petty benches], and in 263 cases the Court declared a law, order,
regulation or official act unconstitutional.' Justice in Japan (Tokyo: Supreme Court of
Japan, 1978), p. 19.
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addition, family courts, Civil Liberties Commissioners, and Local
Administrative Counselors have also brought the law of the constitution
to bear in resolving millions of disputes in a quiet atmosphere. 23 District
courts more often than appellate courts 24 have stressed civil liberties in
their findings; but even the now conservative Supreme Court has
notably nurtured proc~dural rights of the accused 25 while allowing
creeping restraints on the .rights of public employees, on and off the
job. 26 (Other examples are discussed later.) The courts are restrained by
an insufficiency ofjudges, dilatory trial proceedings, jurisprudence that
is sometimes restrictive, and other factors touched on later. In general,
the courts have guarded jealously their tradition since the Meiji
period 27 of judicial independence in deciding individual cases; they
have also upheld their institutional prerogatives in dealing with the Diet
and administrators.
Legal professionals as well as politicians, ranging from rightists to
moderate liberals to democratic socialists to those who view Marxists as
rank conservatives, seem cautious about the intentions of their political
23

Family courts, summary courts, and various modes oflay participation in dispute
resolution are briefly described in Justice in Japan. pp. 14-17, 23-6. Concerning the Civil
Liberties Bureau and Commissioners, see Lawrence W. Beer and C. G. Weeramantry,
'Human Rights in Japan: Some Protections and Problems,' Universal Human Rights, No.
3, 1979, pp. I-33·
24
Concerning Japan's court system and judges, see Itoh and Beer, Constitutional Case
Law of Japan, pp. 7-21, 25o-5; and, on barriers to civil litigation, John Owen Haley,
'The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant,' Journal of Japanese Studies, (summer, 1978):
359-go. In Japanese, Wada Hideo, Saiko saibansho ron (Nihon Hyoronsha, 1970), and
Saiko saibansho (Hogaku seminah-Nihon Hyoronsha, 1977).
25
For example, Abe v. Japan, 20 Keishu (No.6) 537 (Sup. Ct., Second Petty Bench,
July 1, 1966), translated in ltoh and Beer, Constitutional Case Law of Japan, p. 167-8.
26
See, for example, Japan v. O<.awa, 28 Keishu (No. g) 393 (Supreme Court, Grand
Bench, November 6, 1974); for comments, see Lawrence W. Beer, 'Recent Developments-Constitutional Law,' Law in Japan: An Ann!Ull, Vol. 8 (1975): 205-8, and
Nobushige Ukai, 'The Significance of the Reception of American Constitutional
Institutions and Ideas in Japan,' in L. W. Beer (ed.), Constitutionalism in Asia (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 123-6. See generally 'Kenpo
no soten,' Jurisuto <.okan (May, 1978); 'Nihonkoku kenpo,' Jurisuto rinji <.okan, 638 (May,
1977); 'Kenpo 30nen no riron to tenbo,' HOritsu Jiho rinji <.okan (May 1977); Kobayashi
Naoki, Kenpo hand"an no genri, 2 vols (Nihon Hyoronsha, 1978); and Ashibe Nobuyoshi
(ed.), Kenpo (Yiihikaku, 1978), Vol. 2.
21
The Otsu Case (1891) and the Meiji Constitution established judicial independence for the first time in Japan. As Kenzo Takayanagi notes: 'In a sense, the Otsu
Incident and its legacy contradict the basic thesis advanced by the Western scholars
interviewed by Kaneko: the inclusion in the Constitution of~n institution quite foreign
to the Japanese scene provided the foundation on which a tradition of judicial
independence very quickly emerged.' Takayanagi, supra n. 17. See also Marc Galanter,
'The Displacement of Traditional Law in Modern India,' Journal of Social Issues 24
( 1968): 6 5-g~.
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foes on the revision issue. It is more a debate among elites who would
speak on behalf of the citizenry than an issue like economics or education
preoccupying the public in general. Many Japanese of otherwise
differing views would like the revision controversy to cool down
sufficiently to allow a complete rewriting of the Constitution of Japan
into appropriateJapanese language without changing the intent of any
important provision. That may of course be an impossible dream; but
the present translation into Japanese of some parts originally in English
is not adequate, and may be an unnecessary reminder of the document's
Occupation-period origins. 28
Some anti-revisionists maintain the LDP policies and the decisions
of conservative courts have already revised the constitution in fact, if
not formally, in pursuit of a 'reverse course' preference for the prewar
order. 29 Surely, in Japan as in past and present democratic law and
politics the world over, one can find much evidence of an abiding
preference for anti-democratic policies and judicial decisions at both the
official and private levels of society; but the contention that substantive
constitutional revision has occurred seems a doubtful political judgment
and an oversimplification of the tasks of courts in Japan, unless by
'revision' one really means 'interpretation' which one finds needlessly
restrictive. Moreover, the problems in interpreting the Article 9 'no war
clause' are unprecedented in world judicial history; they cannot be
solved or whisked away by too facile a use of'political question' doctrine,
the view in law that courts have no right to decide certain politically
sensitive issues such as those affecting national security. 30
Japan's power centers criticize each other for wrong-headedness
regarding the constitution, and in doing so they manifest the competitive politics essential to the maintenance of liberties. Anti-revisionists
retain sensitivity to the repressive past and show awareness that
democracy is a vulnerable system oflaw and government always in some
respects in tension with its professed ideals.
2

See Tanaka (ed.), Japanese Legal System, pp. 642-85 and works cited therein.
A good presentation of these views is Reinhard Neumann, 'The lnaba Affair,
Constitution Day and Constitutional Revision,' supra, n. 1 1.
30
Hiroshi ltoh, 'Judicial Decision-making in the Japanese Supreme Court,' Law in
Japan: An Annual, vol. 3 (1969): 128-61; Kisaburo Yokota, 'Political Questions and
Judicial Review,' Henderson (ed.), Constitution of Japan, pp. 141-66; Hideo Wada,
'Decisions under Article 9 of the Constitution: The Sunakawa, Eniwa, Naganuma
Decisions,' Law in Japan: An Annual9 ( 1976): 117-28; 'Recent Developments,' ibid~ 153;
Robert L. Seymour, 'Japan's Self-Defense: The Naganuma Case and Its Implications,'
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 47 {1974-75): 421; and Kenneth M. Tagawa, JusticiabiliryandJudicial
Power in Japan, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1979.
ij
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Japan's Constitutional Theory

The Constitution ofJapan is now the most-authoritative reference point
for public values in Japan and is, as Edward Seidensticker has noted,
'among the Sacred Books of the East. ' 31 The constitution's theoretical
thrust is based on natural law suppositions and on the attribution of
intrinsic value to the individual person. So many formal philosophies
and ideologies co-exist inJ a pan's political and intellectual worlds that it
is hard to discern any agreed-upon general theory underpinning
Japanese constitutional democracy. Among the pillars and struts of
Japanese thought are traditional ideas drawn from Buddhism, Confucianism and Shinto, as well as theories related to Christianity and
Marxism; but how they relate to each other, if at all, is elusive. 32 But it is
clear that customary law has had a powerful influence. Though
generally unwritten, these rules are partially expressed in such documents as company rules. 33 A sophisticated syste~ of rules with effective
sanctions governs oyabun-kobun (quasi-parental-filial) group structures 34
and gives specificity to such motive forces as amae (reciprocal dependency)35 and loyalty. Nagao Ryiiichi suggests that a better understanding of the enigmatic urge to absolute loyalty-not simply to loyaltymay be a key to understanding the history of Japanese social and
political ideas. 36
Every five years the Institute of Statistical Mathematics in Tokyo
conducts comprehensive surveys of Japanese national character. The
results indicate that there has been no appreciable modification of a
clear Japanese preference for traditional values since 1 953· Among the
possible approaches to clarifying the principles underpinning or at
31

Edward Seidensticker, 'Japan After Vietnam,' Commentary (September, 1976): 56.
Gino Piovesana, Recent Japanese Philosophical Thought (Tokyo: Enderle Bookstore,
1961); Charles A. Moore (ed.), The Japanese Mind (Honolulu: East-West Center Press,
1968); Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, Kenpo (Yiihikaku, 1962).
33 Carl Steenstrup, 'The Company Code,' Asian Law Forum, Vol. I (1976): 21-5.
34
Chie Nakane, Japanese Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1970).
35
The term 'reciprocal dependency' is taken from Douglas D. Mitchell, Amae: The
Expression of Reciprocal Dependency Needs in Japanese Politics and Law (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1976). Mitchell seems to this writer to present Takeo Doi's important
views on dependency more systematically and more clearly than Doi himself. See also
Takeo Doi, Anatomy of Dependence.
36
Ryiiichi Nagao, in a review of R. Minear, Japanese Tradition and Western Law
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), in Law in Japan: An Annual 5
( 1972): 224. A comparative study of the meanings and objects of loyalty would be very
helpful as a step toward clarifying the bases of intercultural disagreements.
32
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variance with the constitution is analysis of the reasons given by voters
for their voting preferences. An attitude study of I ,500 Tokyo voters was
made in I978 by a team ofjapanese scholars. 37 Analysis indicated that
ideology and party preference were relatively unimportant. The single
most important determinant of political choice (the key factor to 29
percent of voters, and a major factor to 53 percent) 38 was the image of
the candidate as expressing and supporting traditional values and what
might be termed 'the good Japanese way' of doing things. But a most
striking contrast to this preference for traditionalism in the personal style
of candidates is found in the analysis of the positive elements in the
images which voters entertained ofliberalism, capitalism, socialism, and
communism: the most likely to succeed were candidates, ideologies, and
parties presenting an image of flexibility, modernity, conservatism, and
economic egalitarianism somehow combined. For maximum legitimacy, a leader was seen as combining great respect for traditional values
and modes of human interaction with concern for constitutional
freedoms and economic policies promoting equality. Forty-two percent
of the voters studied considered themselves entirely unaffected by
political ideologies such as the four above; only I percent consider·
socialism-communism preferable in general to liberalism-capitalism,
but only IO percent rate the latter pairing preferable to the former.
Along with the strong support for Article 9 pacifism (not a general
philosophy of pacifism) referred to earlier, values such as hierarchy,
equality, groupism, freedom and loyalty form at least part of the
structure of operative constitutional theory in japan. Replacing in some
measure and without much emotion their earlier loyalty to the
Emperor, perhaps the generality ofjapanese now share a loyalty to the
37

Hayashi Chikio et at., Nipponjin no kokuminsei (Shiseido, 1970); and Hayashi Chikio,
'Seiji ishiki no seitai,' Asahi Shinbun, December 16, 1978, p. 4· See also the comprehensive
survey report in Asahi Shinbun,January 1, 1979, pp. 1, Io-13.
The term 'feudal,' often used pejoratively to criticize traditional aspects of modern
Japan, is usually applied to factors such as the family system which predated feudalism
by centuries and which made japanese feudalism different from other feudalisms such as
those of Western Europe. See F. Joiion des Longrais, L'est et /'ouest, institutions du Japon et
de /'occident comparees (Paris and Tokyo, 1958). This writer does not share a uniformly
negative view of Japanese-style.'feudalism' as it functions today.
38
Hayashi, 'Seiji ishiki no seitai.' Only a small percentage (c. 20%) of japanese
expressed much trust in politicians in late 1978 compared, for example, to tax officials (c.
45 %) , judges, teachers, police, doctors, newspapers, and weather forecasters, among
whom the last in the ascending order were the most trusted. Asahi Shinbun, October 22,
1978 andj anuary 1, '979· My only explanation for the extraordinary trust offorecllSters
is good-humored japanese stress on distrust of other categories. Newspapers are trusted
institutions, but the results may have been skewed to their advantage by the fact that the
newspapers did the polling.
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constitution, not as a formal document, but as a summation of preferred
values and guidelines for public action. What the constitution rejects
seems as important as the rights it guarantees, but the whole structure
rests on a recognition of the equal dignity of each individual. As the late
constitutional lawyer Miyazawa Toshiyoshi once expressed it, while
contrasting prewar and postwar Japan, 'Every day I enjoy breathing
freedom again.'

Constitutional Culture and Law

The core new element in post-I945Japanese constitutionalism is legally
protected freedom and individual rights, based primarily on the
Preamble and Chapter III (Articles IO to 40) of the constitution. 39
Japan would very likely be a well-organized (some might say,
over-organized) nation under almost any imaginable governmental
system; but much was added to order by the present constitutional
revolution. The Preamble proclaims that 'sovereign power resides with
the people,' and Article I 3 that 'all of the people shall be respected as
individuals.' This abstract latter provision has been invoked by the
courts as the textual basis for both establishing and limiting certain
constitutional rights. The individual person has replaced the Emperor
as the highest public value. The Emperor is a 'symbol of the State and of
the unity of the people' (Article I); and 'he shall not have powers related
to government' (Article 4). This is the first time the powers of the
Emperor have ever been legally limited, although historically he
seldom, and, since I 868, almost never, actually exercised any political
powers. Although continuities do exist which link present and prewar
institutions, significant changes have been made in their organization
and function. 40 The Cabinet has no military membership and is
collectively responsible to the Diet (Article 66). Constitutional rights,
although in fact sometimes subordinate to informal in-group pressures
39

The Constitution ofJapan, Article 97 in the 'Supreme Law' chapter of the constitution
reads: 'The fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to the people of
Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free; they have survived the many
exacting tests for durability and are conferred upon this and future generations in trust,
to be held for all time inviolate.'
40
On the severe limitations on the emperor's political role as an individual in the
Tokugawa period ( 16oo--1868), see Herschel Webb, The Japanese Imperial Institution in the
Tokugawa Period (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), and for the period
1868-1946, see David A. Titus, Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1974), and Modem Asian Studies, 14,4 (198o), p. 529.
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and bureaucratic presumptions, are more freely exercised than in
prewar Japan, vastly expanded in scope, usually honored by the police,
and justiciable or conciliable in public tribunals. 41 The mass media
serve more adequately than before as a quasi-constitutional Fourth
Estate, a power center relatively independent of any political party or
Ministry, without which Japanese democracy might crumble. 42 The
Diet is the 'highest organ of State power' (Article 41) except for the
ruling political party, yet subject to judicial review (Article 81) of the
constitutionality of its official acts. 43 The court system, supervised by the
Supreme Court, is judicially and administratively independent. Finally,
the status of women has improved markedly, in both fact and law. 44
The Supreme Court and lower courts have the 'power to determine
the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act'; 45 but
like most court systems, they exercise this power against other branches
of government only rarely. They are further restrained by predominantly civil law perceptions of the judicial role in government, a role
of democratic deference to the elected parliament. 46 The technical effect
41
Regarding the police, who enjoy considerable public respect and trust in japan, see
David H. Bayley, Forces of Order: Police Behavior in Japan and the United States (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1976).
Takayanagi Kenzo noted that prewar debates on constitutionality involved political
rhetoric, but rarely justiciable rights; supra, n. 32. 'Conciliable rights' is meant to express
the prevalent style of dispute resolution, involving a third-party status bearer (informal
or official) pursuing compromise and formal harmony. OnJ apanese right consciousness,
see Lawrence W. Beer, 'Freedom of Expression injapan with Comparative Reference to
the United States,' in Claude (ed.), Comparative Human Rights, pp. 101-9; Henderson,
Conciliation and Japanese Law.
42
Discussions in 1978 and 1979 with Ito Masami and Shimizu Hideo. They consider
press freedom more critical to democracy in Japan than in most countries.
43 The Constitution of Japan, 'Article 81. The Supreme Court is the court oflast resort
with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official
act.' Itoh and Beer, Constitutional Case Law of Japan, p. 266. Lower courts, by judicial
decision and Article 76, also have the power of judicial review.
44
Beer and Weeramantry, 'Human Rights in japan.'
45
Article 81 of the Constitution of Japan. Article 76 is also critical: 'The whole judicial
power is vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are established by law.
'2. No extraordinary tribunal shall be established, nor shall any organ or agency of the
Executive be given final judicial power.
'All judges shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience and shall be bound
only by this Constitution and the laws.' Itoh and Beer, Constitutional Case Law ofJapan, p.
265.
For a study of the prewar administrative court system, to which paragraph 2 of Article
76 is in part a reaction, see Hideo Wada, 'The Administrative Court under the Meiji
Constitution,' Law in Japan: An Annual 10 (1977): 1-64.
46
For comparative perspectives, see Beer (ed.), Constitutionalism in Asia; lvo
Duchacek, 'Constitutions: Adapting to Change,' Power Maps: Comparative Politics of
Constitutions (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio Press, 1973), pp. 2 1o--32; Claude, Comparative
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on future law of a judgment of unconstitutionality is still debated, but a
'conclusion in a decision of a superior court shall bind courts below in
respect of the case concerned,' and not in general. 47 For example, if a
legal provision is held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, it is
nevertheless possible that the same or other courts may rule differently in
other cases on the same issue, and it is possible that the Diet will not pass
remedial legislation to remove the offending provision. A judgment of
unconstitutionality does not necessarily trigger among lawyers, legal
scholars, mass media leaders or politicians the requisite sustained
pressure on the Diet to take legislative action to support such a
judgment. 48 If the judicial decision is that an official action is invalid, no
court doctrine has resolved the scholarly debate on whether some legal
provision enables a court to order an administrative agency to take
remedial action. 49 Article 37 of the constitution guarantees the accused
in a criminal case 'the right to a speedy and public trial'; but some
controversial cases have languished in the courts for a decade or even
two (e.g., the 1952 May Day Incident decisions of the 1970s), and years
of delay are commonplace. Widely spaced trial sessions characterize
Japan's civil law system, courts have been used at times as political
forums, causing additional delays, and judges are generally meticulous
in moving slowly towards a decision. These factors may constitute a
systematic obstacle to quick justice.
The conviction rate in Japan is extremely high, approaching 99
percent. But in recent years criminological reasons, rather than
insufficient evidence have led prosecutors not to prosecute around 40
percent of serious violations of the Criminal Code. A lay Inquest of
Prosecution regularly reviews a prosecutor's determinations on whether
or not to file charges; these organs recommend a change or indictment or
a reinvestigation of the case about 10 percent of the time, and such
·recommendations are accepted by the Chief of the District Public
Prosecutor's Office in 30 percent of the cases. 50 'lnJapan in 1971 less
Human Rights; David H. Bayley, Public Liberties in the New States (Chicago: Rand McNally
& Co., 1964). On judicial roles in civil law systems, see john Henry Merryman, The Civil
Law Tradition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1g6g); Rudolf B. Schlesinger,
'Common Law and Civil Law: A Historical Comparison,' Comparative Law, 2nd edition
(Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 1959), pp. 179-98.
47
Article 4, Court Organization Law, Law No. 59 of April 16, 1947· See ltoh and
Beer, Constitutional Case Law of Japan, pp. 7-11, 251-5; Haley, 'Myth of the Reluctant
Litigant,' pp. 381-g; and on the effect of an unconstitutional judgment, Ukai in Beer,
Constitutionalism in Asia.
48
Discussions with judges, Tokyo, 1978-1979.
49
Haley, 'Myth of the Reluctant Litigant,' pp. 387-go.
so Conversation with Matsuo Koya, specialist in criminal procedure law, 1979.
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than 4 percent of persons convicted were given a jail sentence and almost
two-thirds of those were suspended. Over g6 percent of persons
convicted of a crime were punished only with a fine,' usually a small fine.
Forty-four and seven-tenths percent of the convicted went to prison in
the United States that year, and for much longer periods than the
Japanese sentenced. Criminal justice in Japan is generally not severe.
Freedom of expression is a sine qua non of any constitutional
democracy. A review of the status offreedom of expression will thus be a
particularly useful way of conveying reasonably reliable perspectives on
the state ofJapan's democratic law. Issues to be touched on include the
freedom to demonstrate, mass media freedom, privacy, obscenity, and
textbook certification.

The Law of Demonstrations
In any assessment of the strength of freedom, we need to study judicial
decisions, which are the backbone of the law on liberty, but especially
where values differ from Western ones, we need to understand the
society in order to comprehend how law is perceived and how it
functions. For example, the Japanese commitment to groupism instead
of to individualism has not, and does not, prevent people from resorting
to the law to protect their rights and interests. 51 Nor has it been an
obstacle to the people's support for the freedom of expression. 52 But it
has affected the forms that these take.
There is a strong sense of group right rather than individual right in
public contexts, analogous to an individualist sense of right in the West.
Largely due to this, privately and freely organized demonstrations have
been very frequent in postwar Japan. Freedom of association and
freedom of assembly have been central aspects of freedom of expression
in Japan, and contrast sharply to the prewar suppression of these
freedoms. Highly vocal but nonviolent group dissent or advocacy by
groups seems more fully accepted public behavior in Japan than in the
United States. 53 Even peaceful marches sometimes arouse considerable
Bayley, Forces of Order, pp. 141-4. Civil liberties lawyer Ono Masao says police brutality
is very rarely a problem; ibid., pp. 165-6.
51
Haley, 'Myth of the Reluctant Litigant'; Kahei Rokumoto, 'Problems and
Methodology of Study of Civil Disputes,' pt 1, Law in Japan: An Annuals ( 1972): 97-114,
and pt 2, 6 (1973): 111-27.
52
Beer in Claude (ed.), Comparative Human Rights, pp. 101-g.
53
On the other hand, individual dissent and post-consensus dissent from the views of
one's in-group seem notably limited in Japan. However, pre-consensus debate within
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public ire in the United States, as they did during the civil rights and
anti-war movements of the I g6os and I 970s. 54
A number of agencies and laws regulate demonstrations in japan, 55
but the most important are the local 'public safety ordinances' (koan
jorei) and 'public safety commissions' (koan iinkai) of prefectures or
cities. 56 The key constitutional provision on freedom of expression is
Article 2I:
Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press, and all other
forms of expression are guaranteed.
2. No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of
communication be violated.

Basic Supreme Court doctrine on demonstrations and other 'collective activities' was laid down in the landmark Tokyo Ordinance
Decision in Ig6o, 57 which held that local authorities are obliged under
public safety ordinances to grant permits with 'maximum respect for
freedom of expression.' Denial of a permit is legitimate only when a
collective activity 'will directly endanger the maintenance of the public
peace' and thus contravene 'the public welfare' (kokyo no fukushi).
Later judicial decisions have followed and refined Tokyo doctrine. 58
Although the 'public welfare' was defined early (I 950) by the Supreme
Court as 'the maintenance of order and respect for the fundamental
human rights of the individual,' 59 for many years the judicial use of the
term has evoked unease and protest from many constitutional lawyers
and opposition politicians. 'Public welfare' has reminded them of terms
used during the ultra-nationalist period to urge all to forget their own
interests and revere the Emperor. 60
one's group is relatively uninhibited (except by the seniority order of presentation), as is
expression of group disagreement with government policies or the opinions of' outsiders'
of whatever kind. See Beer in ibid.
54
See Bayley, Forces of Order, pp. I 72-83.
55
Freedom of assembly can be regulated under Article 7 of Doro Kotsiiho (Law I05 of
I96o), Article I9 of Densenbyo yoboho (Law 36 of I897), Articles 5 and 7, Hakai katsudO
boshiho (Law 240 of I952), Articles 106 and I07, Keiho, and Article 4 of Ministry of
Welfare Order No. I9 of I949 (Official Gazette, No. 938); and by public safety ordinances.
56
On public safety ordinances and their use, see Beer in Claude (ed.), Comparative
Human Rights.
57
Japan v. Ito, I4 Keishu I243 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, July 20, I96o). For a
translation and the ordinance in question, see Maki ( ed.), Court and Constitution in Japan,
pp. 84-I I6. For an analysis, see Beer in Claude, Comparative Human Rights, pp. I I5-I8.
58
The Supreme Court can and does on occasion reverse its own precedent. For
examples, see Cases 7 and 24 in ltoh and Beer, Constitutional Case Law of Japan.
59
Japan v. Sugino, 4 Keishu 20I2, IOI4 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, I950).
60
See Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, Nihonkoku kenpo (Nihon Hyoronsha, I963), p. 205; and
Yamamoto Keiichi, 'Kokyo no fukushi,' in Tanakajiro (ed.), Nihonkoku kenpo taikei, Vol.
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One of the most significant developments in constitutional law since
I 94 7 may be the decreased use, especially in the lower courts, of abstract
formulations of public welfare doctrine, and increased specificity since
I965. 61 The courts have honed more concrete criteria for determining
what the public welfare is in each class of cases. These technical
developments are in some cases due more to changes in judicial
education, the influence of legal scholars, and accumulated judicial
experience under the I947 constitution than to liberalism. For example,
Tokyo doctrine, which was handed down in the aftermath of the I 960
Security Treaty Crisis, deemphasized the place where demonstrations
are held. In fact, Tokyo upholds the right of authorities to regulate mass
demonstrations 'in any place whatsoever,' contending that debate on
such matters as place is 'completely profitless.' But a 1970 Supreme
Court decision hinged upon the meaning of 'public place' (kokyo no
basho) in the Hiroshima prefectural ordinance. It was defined by the
judges as 'a place which in reality is generally open and can be used and
entered freely by unspecified persons.' 62 The ordinance requires a
permit only for a demonstration which is to take place in a public place.
The accused were public employees who staged a demonstration outside
the prefectural capitol building without obtaining a permit. They
contended the ordinance did not apply, since the location of the
demonstration was not a public place; the judges disagreed, and they
lost their case.
Vigorous exercise of the freedom to demonstrate by groups representing local and national interests will likely continue little affected by
adverse court decisions. Most public group actions injapan are orderly
and peaceful, and are often attended with colorful pageantry and a
festival spirit, a healthy blend of seriousness and play. Convictions for
illegal collective activities are usually for physical obstruction or
violence which would be held illegal in most or all of the world's other
democratic courts; and as noted earlier,Japan's courts are quite lenient
in sentencing. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has been criticized
when it has overturned acquittals handed down by both a trial court
8 (Yiihikaku, I96I}, p. I6. On legal theories in Japan on the public welfare, see Sato
Isao, Kenpo Kenlcu Nyumon, 3 vols (Nihon Hyoronsha, I966) 2: 25-I I 7·
61
Ashibe Nobuyoshi et al., 'Kenpo hanrei no 30nen,' ]urisuto, special issue (:\fay 3,
I977): 452, 453, and in the same issue commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of
Japan's constitution, see Ito Masami, 'Kenpo kaishaku to rieki koryoron,' p. 200, on the
increased judicial use of an interests-balancing approach. See in general this issue of
]urisuto and Kenposanjunen no riron to tenbo, l!Oritsu]iho, rinji zokan (May, I977), onJapan's
constitutionalism.
62
See Asahi Shinbun, July I7, I970 (Sup. Ct., Petty Bench, July I6, I97o);
conversations with Justice Irie Toshio, January, I97 I.
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and an appellate court; this it did about twenty times between I 974 and
I 979 in civil liberties cases. The ever-clearer restriction in the political
activities of public employees to voting alone deserves special mention.
In the late 196os, the Supreme Court recognized that different degrees of
restraint are appropriate to a management-level official in a Ministry
and a janitor in the public monopoly tobacco corporation. 63 But
between 1973 and 1978, decisions of the Supreme Court affected
adversely the political freedom of public employees.
In the famous Sarufutsu Case, 64 for example, a postal employee was
convicted for putting up six political posters on a public bulletin board
during his leisure hours. The issues still debated include the proper
delineation of limits on the rights of teachers, postal workers, telecommunications workers, and transportation workers to strike or to engage
in political activities, and whether administrative discipline (most
common), criminal penalties or no punishment should be applied for
related violations of the laws governing public employees.

Some Aspects of Freedom for the Mass Media
Along with group activism, freedom of the press is particularly close to
the core ofjapanese democracy, because the mass media may represent
the only power centers that are effectively organized, separate from the
government, linked with important people and groups, especially in
Tokyo and Osaka, and whose influences spread throughout the nation.
Japan's print and broadcast media are mammoth in scale, technologically impressive, and socially pervasive. 65 Daily newspapers with
nationwide circulation like the Asahi Shinbun, Mainichi Shinbun, Yomiuri
Shinbun, and Nihon Keizai Shinbun print over fifty million copies each day,
about twenty percent of which are distributed in Tokyo. The newspapers' political roles are complex, although the major papers do not
63

See, for example, Japan v. Sakane et al., supra n. I5, and Toyama et al. v. Japan, 20
Keishii (No. 8) goi (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, October 26, Ig66), in Itoh and Beer,
Constitutional Case Law of Japan, pp. 85-I30. See also RodiJ to jinken (Hogaku
seminah-Nihon Hyoronsha, I978).
64
Japan v. Ozawa, 28 Keishu (No. g) 393 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, November6, I974).
For comment, see Ukai in Beer (ed.), Constitutionalism in Asia, pp. I22-5; and 'Recent
Developments-Constitutional Law,' Law in Japan: An Annual8 (I975): 205-8.
65
On the courts and media, see Lawrence W. Beer, 'Freedom oflnformation and the
Evidentiary Use of Film in japan .... ,' The American Political Science Review 65 (I97I):
I I 1g-34; Genron to masu komi (Hogaku seminah-Nihon Hyoronsha, I978); Gendai no masu
komi, Jurisuto, sogotokushu No.5 (October I976); Masami Ito et al., Broadcasting in Japan
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978); Horibe Masao, Akusesuken Iowa nanika
(Iwanami Shinsho, 1978).
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endorse political candidates. For example, the press helped to sustain
the crisis atmosphere for a time during the 1960 Security Treaty Crisis,
they moderated the tension in most cases during the nationwide
University Crisis of 1g68-6g, they massively publicized the Lockheed
scandals and trials during the 1970s after disclosures were made in the
United States, and they have played a major role in activating,
publicizing and supporting the consensus against pollution since 1970.
The principal organization for newspapers, television and radio is the
Nihon Shinbun Kyokai Qapan Newspaper Editors and Publishers Association), which at times when a need is felt can form a cohesive power
center by alliance among its leaders in the face of external threat. For
example, during the Hakata Station Film Controversy of 1969, the
media united to oppose a court order for evidence to be presented (TV
film of a student-police confrontation) in the alleged absence of other or
better evidence. The Supreme Court upheld the courts' prerogatives
after months of well-organized media reistance.
The University of Missouri world survey of press freedom rates japan
highly, but has noted industry centralization and self-regulation as
problems. On the latter score, the 'kisha kurabu' (press clubs) attached to
politicians or agencies may be mentioned. Reporters from competing
papers do not so much compete for news, as they form a coherent group
which may determine when what news is suitable for release to their
respective papers. Stable ties can develop between a 'reliable source'
and a press club; the wishes of both the club and the source may heavily
influence what a reporter decides to convey to the public. (Foreign
correspondents are not welcome.) There is some merit in the system,
because secrecy-loving officials would probably obstruct access to
information more substantially, if the cordial relations of mutual trust
with the press did not exist. On the other hand, this system of
agency-media and reporter-reporter relations too effectively limits the
freedom ofinformation, and is one reason why news of such affairs as the
Lockheed scandals derived first from foreign sources rather than from
Japanese investigative journalism. The right of access to information
(akusesuken) and the individual's right to know have been major themes
studied by specialists such as Ito Masami, Shimizu Hideo, Okudaira
Yasuhiro, and Horibe Masao.
In the Nishiyama Decision of 1978, 66 the Supreme Court made its first
ruling on the relationships between state secrets and newsgathering.
66

Nishiyama v. Japan, Hanrei Jiho 887 (July r r, 1978): 14-41 (Sup. Ct., First Petty
Bench, May 31, 1978); Ronald G. Brown, 'Government Secrecy and the "People's
Right to Know" in Japan: Implications of the Nishiyama Case,' Law in Japan: An Annual

22

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

While attached to the Foreign Ministry, Nishiyama Takichi, a reporter
for the Mainichi Shinbun, gained access to secret cables on the negotiation
of terms for the reversion ofOkinawa to japan. Nishiyama had received
this information from Hasumi Kikuko, a girl friend working in the
Ministry. At a Diet committee meeting on March 27, I972, a Socialist
OSP) member made the contents of the cables, received somehow from
Nishiyama, a part of his attack on government policies. The documents
contradicted the government's earlier assurances that no secret agreements had been made with the U.S. The Supreme Court held: (I) that
the courts have the authority to determine what constitutes a state secret
under the National Public Employees Law (and what, for example, is
merely a political secret); (2) that the government's secrecy regarding
international negotiations in this case was appropriate; (3) that the
government's failure to bring the full facts before the Diet did not
conflict with the constitutional order or constitute illegal secrecy; and
(4) that although free newsgathering and reporting are of special
importance to the people's democratic right to know and freedom of
expression generally, Nishiyama violated the legal prohibition against
inducing divulgence of official secrets by a public employee in his
ethically questionable relationship with Hasumi, a married woman.
The right of privacy has been another noteworthy issue in recent law.
Expanded press freedom since I 945 has occasioned an increase in
journalistic excursions into the private lives of political leaders, other
public figures, and ordinary citizens (unknown but for a cruel expose). 67
The former have served the people's right to know about and criticize
the famous and the powerful. According to a survey, both well-known
and unknown victims of defamation and violation of privacy more often
suffer in silence and 'go to bed weeping' (nakineiri suru) than assert their
legal rights as individuals. The consensus among scholars seems to be
that there have been too few legal charges lodged by victims. Where any
redress has been sought, the more common solution has been a
conciliatory out-of-court settlement with public and private apologies
and monetary compensation by publishers.
IO ( I977)i I I2-39· See also the final report of the Secrecy and Disclosure Subcommittee,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, October, I978, U.S. Senate.
67
Lawrence W. Beer, 'Defamation, Privacy and Freedom of Expression in Japan,'
Law in Japan: An Annual 5 (I 972): I 92-208; Ito Masami, Puraibashii no kenri (I wan ami
Shoten, I963); Shimizu Hideo, HO to masu komyii.nikeshon (Shakai Shisosha, I97o); and
Meiyo-puraibashii no shintenkai, Jurisuto 653 (December I, I 977). On rights of the person in
the United States, see Don R. Pember, Privacy and the Press (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, I972); and Arthur R. Miller, The Assault on Privacy (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, I97I).
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Courts and scholars alike have strongly supported the rights to
privacy (puraibashii) and good name, but there seems to have been a low
demand for the legal protection of these rights at least until the I970S. In
sharp contrast to official secrecy, the right of privacy seems to have been
less honored in group-oriented Japan than the right of families,
occupational groups or other groups or communities to know about the
affairs of their members, and to impose sanctions for deviance. For
example, the institution of ostracism from the community (mura hachibu)
for non-conformity is a persistent problem, according to Japan's Civil
Liberties Bureau. 68 On the other hand, if one values the positive aspects
of the strong Japanese sense of community, one must hope that a stress
on privacy rights will not unduly disturb it.
The constitutional right of privacy was first established inJapan not
by a law, but by a I964 Tokyo district court decision against Mishima
Yukio in a case involving his novel Utage no A to (After the Banquet). 69 The
novel, serialized in Chuo lloron in I g6 I, dealt in thinly veiled fashion with
marital affairs of Arita Hachiro, a Socialist OSP) politician and
unsuccessful gubernatorial candidate in the I g6o Tokyo elections. Arita
sued Mishima, who was ordered to pay a substantial amount in
damages. The emergence of the right of privacy is an example of the
considerable influence of Japanese legal scholars on some areas of the
law, the fruitful interaction of campus and court, and the importation of
a legal concept from American law into Japanese legal discourse.
I>H Conversation with Onizuka Kentaro, Head, Civil Liberties Bureau, Justice
Ministry, October, 1978. See Beer and Weeramantry, 'Human Rights in japan,' p. 13.
Mura hachibu, ostracism from the village, was the prototype of this powerful sanction, but
for the Tokugawa period, machi hachibu (ostracism from commercial districts of towns
and cities) was also common. See Nihon Kei<.ai ]iten (Nihon hyoronsha, 1943), p. 1844Today mura hachibu is the official catch-all term for illegal ostracism. In the cities, mura
hachibu may even include ostracism of a housewife in a modern apartment complex by
other women living there.
69
Arita v. Mishima, 15 Kakyu Minshu (No. g) 2317 (Tokyo district court, September
28, 1964). For Donald Keen's translation of the novel at issue, see Yukio Mishima, After
the Banquet (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963). On private enforcement of rights, see
Hideo Tanaka and Akio Takeuchi, 'The Role of Private Persons in the Enforcement of
Law: A Comparative Study ofjapanese and American Law,' Law in Japan: An Annual7
(1974): 34-50. The Civil Code provisions are:
'Article 709. A person who violates intentionally or negligently the right of another is
bound to make compensation for damage arising therefrom.
'Article 710. A person who is liable in compensation for damages in accordance with
the provisions of the preceding Article shall make compensation therefor even in respect
of a nonpecuniary damage, irrespective of whether such injury was to the person, liberty
or reputation of another or to his property rights.'
A theory which would directly apply such constitutional guarantees as good name
and privacy without reference to code provisions seems to have little support. See lJkai
in Beer, Constitutionalism in Asia, p. 1 22; and Ashibe, Kenpo, pp. 39-97·
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The constitutional basis for the privacy right is found in the sentence,
'All of the people shall be respected as individuals' in Article I 3, while
code law provision is detected in Articles 709 and 7IO ofthe Civil Code,
under which a person is bound to make compensation for intentional or
negligent violation of the right of another, whether 'injury was to the
person, liberty, or rep~tation of another or to his property rights.'
Among other noteworthy privacy cases are the following:
(I) A I 969 Supreme Court decision held that, as an aspect of the
right of privacy, one has the right not to be photographed against one's
will during an illegal demonstration unless the photography was
necessary to a criminal investigation. 70
(2) A I969 Tokyo high court decision in the Kato Case required a
weekly magazine to pay remuneration and to apologize publicly in a
national newspaper, on grounds of damage to good name and privacy
rights. 71 The magazine at issue claimed that two famous TV and film
personalities cohabited before marriage, which was denied.
(3) In I 970, an injunction to ban the showing of an art film on the
grounds of privacy violation was denied. 72 The film dealt with the early
amorous and political affairs of an elderly feminist politician, Kamichika Ichiko; but she herself had publicized her private life on a number
of prior occasions, thus negating in the court's view the confidentiality
factor necessary for a valid claim of privacy violation.
(4) The I977 Kawabata Case was settled out of court with public
apologies for lack of circumspection. The bereaved family of the late
Nobel Prize-winning novelist, Kawabata Yasunari, sued the publisher
and author of a novel which suggested that Kawabata's I972 suicide
was linked to indiscreet relations with the family maid, apparently an
outcast burakumin. 73
Incidentally, the increase in civil defamation suits in the early I 970s
70
Hasegawa v. Japan, 23 Keishu 1625 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, December 24, 1969).
For a translation, see ltoh and Beer, Constitutional Case Law rif Japan, pp. 178-82. Similar
specification of the public welfare as what is necessary for criminal justice is used by the
same court in Kaneko v. Japan, 23 Keishu 1490 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, November 26,
1969), translated in ibid., pp. 246-50.
71
Kato v. Shiikan ]itsuwa, Hanrei Jiho 537 ( 1968) 28 (Tokyo district court, November
25, 1968), and Shiikan Jitsuwa v. Kato, ]urisuto 449 (1970): 128 (Tokyo high court,
December 25, 1969).
72
'Eros+Gyakusatsu' Case, Kamichika v. Art Theatre Guild, Jurisuto 449 (1970): 21
(Tokyo district court, March 14, 1970), and 23 1\ominshu (No.2) 172 (Tokyo high court,
April 13, 1970). See also, Asahi Shinbun, April 13 and 14 (morning and evening edns).
73
Kawabata v. Chikuma Shobo et al., Tokyo district court, 1977. See Japan Times Weekry
Edition, August 27, 1977. Burakumin are still discriminated against socially, despite laws
to the contrary, as noted in the concluding section of this paper.
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exemplifies the utility of analyzing the side effects of specific legal
changes. 74 An important but unintended and unforeseen byproduct of
legal change in one issue area affected the effects and applications oflaw
in another. Prior to I970, very few civil defamation suits had been
brought to court compared, for example, to German and French
experience under similar defamation laws. 75 In the early I970s, the
success of groups and individuals bringing civil suits against companies
for injury or illness caused by pollution was thoroughly publicized. As a
result, popular awareness of the possibility of effective court action
against newspapers and other media enterprises for civil defamation rose
dramatically, and so did the number of successful suits. 76 •
The obscenity question is another media-related issue affected by the
second modern constitutional revolution. Under Article I 75 of the
Criminal Code, various laws regulating the media, the police laws,
obscenity regulation, public security maintenance and thought control
were sometimes linked in the Japanese official mind before I945. 77
Today, such connections are seen by few officials and citizens. Since the
Occupation period, Japan has been again rather tolerant, producing
large numbers of erotic books, pictures, magazines, comic books,
advertisements, TV broadcasts, motion pictures and tape recordings. 78
There have been two major Supreme Court decisions on obscenity,
both concerning translations of foreign works: the I 95 7 Lady Chatterley's
Lover Case 79 and the I 969 de Sade Case. 80 Article I 75 provides penalties
74

See the statistics for both civil and criminal defamation in annual reports in l!Oso
Jiho ( l!Osokai).
75
For example, at least until the I 970s, on a per capita basis France and Germany had
roughly 200 times as many defamation suits and ten times more convictions thanjapan.
See K. Igarashi and H. Tamiya, Meiyo to puraibashii ( I968), pp. 74-78; Jurisuto 332
(I965): 6o; and Jurisuto 653 (I970).
76
Conversations with judge Muto Shunko, Legal Training and Research Institute,
in july, I973 and December, I978. The sharp rise in civil defamation suits peaked in
I973 and thereafter leveled off.
77
The term'waisetsu' (obscenity) and punishment of its 'public display or sale' first
appeared in Article 259 of the Criminal Code of I88o. Article I75 of the I907 revised
Criminal Code remains today the primary legal provision for restraint of obscenity,
amended only in I 94 7 by the addition of imprisonment to fines as possible penalties. See
Shimizu, l1o to masu komyunikeshon, and Okudaira Y asuhiro, Hyogen no jiyu towa nanika
(Chiiokoronsha, I970).
78
Shimizu, l1o to masu komyunikeshon, pp. I 7o-89, presents historical perspective on
Japan's obscenity law.
79
Ito et at. v. Japan, I I Keishu (No.3) 997 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, March I 3, I957); a
translation is in Maki, Court and Constitution in Japan, pp. 3-37.
80
Ishii et at. v. Japan, 23 Keishu (No. 10) I 239 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, October I 5,
I969); all opinions are translated in ltoh and Beer, Constitutional Case LAw of Japan, pp.
I83-2 I 7·
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for 'a person who distributes or sells an obscene writing, picture or other
object or who publicly displays the same ... '. 81 In Chatterley the
Supreme Court held that twelve obscene passages at issue infected D.H.
Lawrence's entire work with obscenity, and defined obscenity as
follows: 82 'In order for a writing to be obscene, it is required that it
wantonly arouse and stimulate sexual desire, offend the normal sense of
shame, and run counter to proper concepts of sexual morality.'
The Chatterley decision has continued to draw criticism from liberal
scholars for arrogating to the courts 'a clinical role' in the event society's
moral views become lax. In de Sade, the court generally followed
Chatterley doctrine, but seemed to some analysts to stress artistry and
intellectual values more than Chatterley in the following passage: 83
There may be cases where the artistry and intellectual content of a work may
diminish and moderate the sexual stimulus caused by its portrayal of sex to a
degree less than that which is the object of punishment in the Criminal Code, so
as to negate obscenity....

Dissenting opinions denied the obscenity of the partial translation of de
Sade's In Praise of Vice either because of its artistic and intellectual
content, or because its sadistic repulsiveness reduced its erotic appeal to
insignificance. Majority doctrine is regarded by commentators as
somewhat restrictive. 84
While providing binding guidelines for official Japan, judicial
decisions do not give much hint of the systems for purveying and
regulating obscenity in Japan. Critical to freedom of erotica are public
agencies and private regulatory agencies connected with different
industries. For example, the major motion picture producer-distributors
abide by decisions of their own Motion Picture Ethics Committee (Eiga
Rinrikitei Kanri Iinkai, or Eirin) in applying the industry's code of ethics
and their understanding of what is legally permissible. 85 The film Kuroi
Yuki (Black Snow) was shown with the approval of Eirin, but was held
~ 1 Ministry of justice, japan, Criminal Statutes (n.d.), Vol. I, p. 39·

82

See Maki, Court and Constitution in Japan, p. 7·
Itoh and Beer, Constitutional Case Law of Japan, p. 184. See also Chin Kim,
'Constitution and Obscenity: japan and the U.S.A.,' American Journal of Comparative Law
23 ( 1975): 255·
84
lto Masami and Shimizu Hideo (eds), Masu komi horeiyoran (Gendaijii.narizumu
Shuppankai, I 966); Shimizu, 110 to masu komy'imikeshon; Okudaira, Hyogen no jiyU Iowa
83

nanika.
85

Discussions with Ito Masami, a member of Eirin, August", I979· Concerning Eirin,
see Masu Komi Rinri Kondankai (ed.), Masu komi no shakai sekinin (Nihon Shinbun
K yokai, I g66), hereafter cited as Sekinin. Onj a pan's film industry see also J. I. Anderson
and D. Richie, The Japanese Film: Art and Industry (New York: Grove Press, Ig6o).
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obscene by the Tokyo high court in I969. 86 For some years after that,
the courts did not accept Eirin's view as a basis for immunity from
prosecution. Black Snow depicted the life of prostitutes in the environs of
an American base. The accused were acquitted on grounds that until
this judicial decision, they could assume reasonably that if Eirin
approved of a work, it was indeed legal. On the other hand, the Tokyo
district court held in the I 978 Nikkatsu Romantic Sex Film Case 87 that
Eirin was an instrument for determining what is in accord with
prevailing community standards, and acquitted the Nikkatsu company
of obscenity charges based on Eirin approval of its films. However, scores
of 'eroductions' appear annually, unregulated by Eirin and rarely
restricted by officials.
The Customs Bureau censors imported films and pictures, 88 particularly those brought in for commercial purposes, with the assistance of a
committee of citizens of'learning and experience.' 89 The constitutionality of this system is questioned by scholars, and some judges. In the first
test case reaching the appellate level-one involving a challenge to a
denial of permission to import nude picture books-the Supreme Court
in I 979 ordered a retrial favoring the challenge, but did not clearly
present its own doctrine. 90
Frank and undisguised pornographic writings with the traditional
designation of shunpon (literally, springtime books), can be found in
specialized shops and do not often generate widespread concern. Weekly
pulp magazines, poster advertisements, pornography vending
machines, and lewd comic books for children present the most
noteworthy problems today. Their content is often strongly erotic and
presents a degraded image ofhumanity, especially women.
About sixty percent of japan's popular magazine sales take place in
newsstands in railway stations, where concession privileges are con86 Japan v. Murakami et al., Hanrei JihO 57 I (November II, I969): I9 (Tokyo high
court, September I7, I969).
87
Japan v . .Nikkatsu Co., Hanrei JihO 897 (October II, I978): 39-53 (Tokyo district
court, June 23, I978); Asahi Shinbun,June 23 (evening edn), 24, I978. 'Black Snow' was
also a Nikkatsu film. In the I970s Nikkatsu turned out a series of sexually explicit films
allegedly to help clear up debts due to legal fees in an earlier case, and due to the
depression of Japan's film industry. Japan Times, November 4, I977; Asahi Shinbun,
January 28 (eveningedn), (eveningedn), February II, May 25, and June 2I, I972; and
Fujiki Hideo, 'Eirinjiken 0 meguru horitsu mondai,' ]urisuto 504 (May I, I972): s6. For
'Poruno sangyo toshite no Nihon eiga,' see Asahi ]anaru (April 28, I972): 38; also
]urisuto, special issue (December Io, I97o).
88
This was done under the Customs Standards Law (Kanzei teiritsu ho), Law 54 of
April II, I9II, Article II, which is in Ito and Shimizu, Masu komi horeiyoran, p. 75·
89
For examples of seizures at airports, see Asahi Shinbun, January I7, I979·
90
Hanrei Jiho 707 (I973): I6 (Tokyo high court, April 26, I973)·
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trolled by the private Railroad Benefit Association (Tetsuao llosaikai). 91
The RBA can forbid the sale of a magazine or a particular issue of a
magazine which its officials feel might be obscene. Among other
sanctions, should police seize a magazine under obscenity law, the RBA
may ban the next three issues from all its newsstands.
Local systems for regulating reading material outside train stations
vary. For example, the private but powerful Tokyo Newspaper Sellers
Commission ( Tokyoto Shinbun Sokubai Iinkai) 92 determines the permissibility of distributing certain magazines to member newsstands and
bookstores, and makes periodic spot checks to assure compliance with its
policies. Ifobjectionable material is found, a review committee considers
the case and rna y issue a warning. Three warnings in a single year or one
police seizure of a magazine may bring suspension of the seller's
franchise. In addition, the Publications Ethics Council (Shuppan Rinri
Kyogikai) has been the publishing industry's main self-regulatory agency
since I 963; but it does not appear very vigorous and it is helpless vis-a-vis
'outsiders', who do not belong to the Magazine Publishers Association
(,Zasshi Kyokai) or other industry organizations. 93
The above and other private-sector systems of restraint combine in a
complex web; they are supplemented by 39 local youth protection
ordinances. 94 Ordinances such as Tokyo's encourage primary reliance
upon self-regulatory systems. The Tokyo Governor may give warnings
which, if not heeded, are followed by an order to stamp 'unfit for youth'
on the cover of offending publications. In some cases, a dozen or more
official cautions or warnings have been given before any other
enforcement action was taken against pornography affecting children. 95
In 1979, parental and official concern focused on pornography vending
machines within easy access of young children, and on objectionable TV
advertisements and films shown during children's usual viewing
91 Sekinin, pp. 5 I-75·. (This book, available only at the offices of the Nihon Shin bun
Kyokai, remains a principal source of information on private regulatory systems.) In
addition to the criminal and customs law provisions already mentioned, obscenity is also
regulated under llogyo ho (Law 137 ofJuly 10, 1948), Fuzoku eigyo torishimari ho, Kankyo
eisei ho, Denpa ho, HOso ho, and local youth protection ordinances.
92 Sekinin, pp. 273, 64.
93 Asahi Shinbun, January 22, 1979, an interview with Nunokawa Kakuzaemon,
President, Publication Ethics Council, and member, Tokyo Youth Protection Council.
94 Sekinin, p. 208; and Nihon Keizai Shinbun, July 12, 1978.
95 Nihon Keizai Shinbun,July 12, 1978. For example, amidst widespread parental and
public concern, pornography vending machines in Saitama Prefecture increased from
887 in August, 1977 to 2,1 16onJuly 31, 1978. Mter a great many warnings, police seized
two machines in October, 1978. Asahi Shinbun, October 10, 1978.
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hours. 96 Efforts to solve the latter problem have been led by local TV
branches of the Federation of Commercial Broadcasting Labor Unions
(Minpo Roren). 97
As in other areas of regulation, so in restraining obscenity, particularly on behalf of children, Japanese regulatory authority is spread
around among many public and private agencies, while the courts and
interested scholars debate rather abstract definitions. The picture that
emerges is not one of clear or simple leniency or restrictiveness, but
relations between law and society resembling in complexity a kanji
ideograph of 25 strokes. As William Spinrad notes in his sociology of civil
liberties, formalized and just legal structures are essential to freedom,
but are 'never a carbon-copy reflection of the libertarian or anti-libertarian attitudes of politicians or any general public consensus. ' 98 This
applies toJapan. 99
Government certification of pre-collegiate textbooks has been
another object of controversy for many years, in part in reaction to the
very stringent controls of prewar days. In the complicated processes of
writing, publishing, local selection, and marketing of such textbooks
may be found unintended restrictions on freedom which may be more·
important than censorship, 100 and these problems are further complicated by the polarization of debate on some educational issues along
rigid political lines. The textbook certification process takes place within
the Ministry of Education. The Ienaga Textbook Review Cases significantly challenged administrative review criteria and processes with
respect to textbooks, but also dramatized the continuing sensitivity of
many Japanese to anything even faintly reminiscent of the thought
control exercised by the prewar government. Professor Ienaga Saburo
brought two suits, in rg65 and in rg67, against the Ministry of
Education for requiring him to make changes in the manuscript of his
revised high school history text under the Ministry's textbook certification system. Both cases 101 were on appeal in rg8o, one to the Supreme
9
° For example, occasionally imported Western films restricted to adult-oriented
theatres in the United States are shown on commercial television inj a pan. See also Asahi
Shinbun, September 22, 23, and December 12 (evening edn), 1978.
97
Ibid.
98 Spinrad, Civil Liberties, pp. 5-26, 292-306. On the law and experience of the L' nited
States, see The Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography (New York: Bantam
Books, 1970), especially pp. 346--442.
99
For related opinion poll data, see Asahi Shinbum,January 3, 1979, p. 7·
100
See Lawrence W. Beer, 'Education, Politics and Freedom of Expression in japan:
The Ienaga Textbook Review Cases,' Law in Japan: An AnnualS (1975): 67-go.
101
lenaga v. MinistryofEducation,Hanrei]iho 604 ( 1970): 35 (Tokyo district court,July
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Court against a 1975 high court ruling 102 that the Ministry had failed to
adhere to its own criteria in assessing Ienaga's book.
Among the issues raised by the Ienaga cases are freedom of expression,
academic freedom, the educational rights of parents, children and the
state, and the question of whether the controversies themselves are
among the great constitutional cases ofmodernJ a pan (a view this writer
shares) or exclusively matters of administrative and civil law. A key
point of contention was whether Ienaga's book was unfairly critical of
the imperial family in discussing the mythological and historical origins
of the Emperor system, so as to imply, to some, authoritarian unconcern
for the people. The relevant passages are of less interest to Japanese
school children than tonight's TV programs; but the length of the
Ienaga controversy and the intensity of feeling supporting Ienaga well
illustrate the concern ofjapanese intellectual elites, if not necessarily the
generality of citizens, about possible reversion to reverence for the
Emperor and an overturning of the postwar constitutional revolution.
The treatment accorded pre-1945 history, domestic and international,
in many school textbooks does gloss over a great many unpleasant facts,
and Ienaga is not alone in complaining about this tendency. 103 lenaga's
special concern is understandable, as he was a principal co-author of the
first official history text for the compulsory grades in postwar Japan. 104
Moreover, official systems for restricting freedom of thought and
expression in prewar Japan were realistically seen as coercive measures
secondary to and supplementary to the desired natural effects of a
modern public education system permeated with the imperial orthodoxy over a period of decades.

Conclusion: Some Problems and Prospects

Japan is now in a constitutional era when concern about reversion to the
prewar system may recede into the background for the salaried man and
17, 1970); and lenaga v. Ministry ofEducation, Hanrei]iho, special issue (October 15, 1974)
and Jurisuto 569 (1974): 14 (Tokyo district court, july 16, 1974).
102 Ministry of Education v. lenaga, Hanrei Jiho Boo (1976): 19 (Tokyo high court,

December 20, 1975).
103 Private discussions with Japanese textbook authors at various times during the
1970S.
104 Ministry of Education (ed.), Kuni no ayumi (October, 1946). For a recent
expression of Ienaga's views, see Rekishi no naka no kenpo (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai,
1977), 2 vols. Ienagasees the issues in broad constitutional and political terms, as part of
efforts on behalf of Article 9 and against constitutional revision. Correspondence with
the author, December 10, 1978.
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his family. 105 Among noteworthy constitutional issues now pending
are: the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces; limits on the
freedom of expression of public employees; delayed justice in the courts;
unreviewed internal rules and processes of regulatory agencies which
affect individual rights; the extent of expanding environmental rights;
discrimination against burakumin (traditional outcasts), women,
Okinawans, and resident aliens; and serious malapportionment of seats
in the Diet.
In substance, the Supreme Court will most likely concur with the
Sapporo high court in upholding the constitutionality of the SelfDefense Forces in the Naganuma Case. 106 The debate on this case in the
past decade has helped to refine and clarify positions on this unique
issue. Article g's pacifist provisions may well continue to be meaningful
in law and politics as a unique symbol of self-restraint on military power
and the constitutional order under the 'Peace Constitution,' and needs
to be understood by Japan's allies. Whether a similar confluence of
history, internal law and politics, and geopolitics will enable pacifism to
occur in another nation-state remains to be seen.
Discrimination is a significant constitutional and human problem in
Japan, although it does not receive much attention from scholars and is
of interest to relatively few lawyers, politicians and citizens as yet. The
Civil Liberties Bureau works imaginatively to combat discrimination
through educational means and the Civil Liberties Commissioner
system. 107 Social discrimination against the million Okinawans is likely
to continue. The burakumin, numbering something over 1·5 million by
government estimates and 3 million according to the Burakumin
Liberation Movement, have been helped, as Japanese citizens, by
remedial discrimination in the 1970s which has provided them with
educational and other aid. 108 However, resident aliens, legal and
illegal, have little recourse under Japanese law, and are not eligible
for aid from the Civil Liberties Commissioners. 109 Most notable are
roughly 65o,ooo Koreans, so,ooo Chinese, and the 2,500 unwelcome

105
See Asahi Shinbun, January 1, 1979, pp. 1, g-13. Survey results therein indicate
middle-class preoccupation, not with large political questions, especially those of the
past, but with work, inflation, children's education, and other immediate problems.
106
See sources cited supra, n. 30.
107
Beer and Weeramantry, 'Human Rights in japan'.
108
Tokei Nenkan (Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1977), p. 26.
109
Discussions with Onizuka Kentaro (Head, Civil Liberties Bureau), Nakadaira
Kenkichi (attorney), Sasahara Keisuke (attorney}, and Ando lsamu (Head, Asian
Relations Center, Sophia University, Tokyo}, in 1978 and 1979.
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refugees from Indochina in and out ofjapan since mid-1975. 11 For the
above and for women, employment discrimination is the most discussed
problem. Many burakumin and aliens also suffer private restraints on
their choice of a marriage partner. 111
Revised rules of the LDP for the selection of the party president (and,
as a consequence, the Prime Minister) which were used for the first time
in late 1978 have established something comparable to a primary
election system, though not preliminary, as in the United States, to a
popular election for public office, but to a run-off election for party
leadership. This may be viewed as a quasi-constitutional innovation, as
previously the electors were limited to the parliamentary party, plus
prefectural party leaders. Votes were cast by registered LDP members
throughout the country in November, 1978, and Ohira Masayoshi
received perhaps the highest total (more than 55o,ooo votes) ever
received in an election by a single aspirant to the premiership. 112 Ohira
became party president, when the second-ranking vote-getter (offour
candidates), Fukuda Takeo, declined to participate in a run-off election.
The new system encourages broader popular participation in LDP
politics.
110
Japan came under some international pressure in I978 and I979 to allow some
refugees to reside in Japan. However, as ofJuly I979, only I2 Southeast Asian refugees
had been given visas for a year or so of residence. Of wider interest in Japan with respect
to rights of foreigners in Japan was the McLean Case, McLean v. Japan, Hanrei Jiho 903
(December I, I978): 3-20 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, October 4, I978). The Supreme
Court denied McLean, a teacher active in peaceful and legal activities opposing the
American involvement in Vietnam in I969-I970, the renewal of his visa, saying that
while foreign residents in Japan have the same freedom of expression under the
Constitution as Japanese citizens, the Justice Ministry has discretionary authority to
take into account whatever factors it thinks appropriate, including legal political
activities, when determining whether or not to renew a visa. See Katsuhiko Okazaki,
'Foreign Nationals in Japan and the Human Rights Question,' The Japan Timu,
December I7, I978; Kokusaikajidai no horitsu mondai, Jurisuto 68I Qanuary I, I979),
·especially pp. I3-26, 66-76.
111
Sources cited supra, n. 109; Asahi Shinbun, January 2I, I979;Joyce C. Lebra et al.
(eds), Women in Changing Japan (Boulder: Westview Press, I976); seen. I I4, irifra.
112
The LDP rules provide that one electoral point is assigned to a prefectural party
chapter for every I ,ooo party members. The two national party candidates with the
most votes in each prefecture divide the points in proportion to the number of votes each
receives in the 'primary'. No other candidates are allotted electoral points. The voting
for the four candidates in the I978 primary election was as follows: Ohira Masayoshi
550,89I (748 points); Fukuda Takeo, 472,503 (638); Nakasone Yasuhiro, I97,957 (93);
Komoto Toshio, 88,9I7 (46). Asahi Shinbun, morning and evening edns, November 27,
28, and December 8, I 978. After the first round in a primary with more than two
candidates in which no one has received a majority of the points, the top two vote-getters
compete in a run-off election. In I978, Fukuda withdrew his candidacy before the
run-off. See also Minoru Shimizu, 'LDP Reform Movement Retrogresses,' The Japan
Times, May 24, I979·
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However, the malapportionment of seats in the House ofRepresentatives and the less-powerful House of Councilors under the Public Office
Election Law is an unresolved constitutional problem the political
parties have chosen not to solve by legislative action. In 1976, the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional the distribution of lower house
seats in 1972. 113 The degree of malapportionment was against ,requirements for equality under the law and universal adult suffrage, and
against the prohibition on discrimination against any particular
candidates for public office. 114 (Candidates, for example, who must get
twice as many votes as candidates in another district in order to be
elected are suffering a form of discrimination.) But the court invalidated
neither the election nor the subsequent actions of the malapportioned
Diet, as requested by the plaintiffs. In 1975 the Diet added twenty seats,
bringing the total to 5 I I ; 11 5 but the apportionment as of the December
1976 general elections were also challenged, in two cases decided in
1978. The first decision, handed down by the Tokyo high court, 116
upheld the constitutionality of the apportionment; while the second,
much more widely supported, 117 struck it down as a violation of the
Article 14 requirement of equality under the law. Both holdings were on
appeal to the Supreme Court before October, I 979, when the next lower
113

Kuroka v. Chiba Prefecture Election Commission, 30 Minshu 223 (Sup. Ct., Grand
Bench, April 14, I 976). See 'Recent Developments,' Law in Japan: An Annual 9 (I 976):
151-2.
114
Constitution of Japan:
'Article I4. All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no
discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social
status or family origin .... '
'Article I 5· The people have the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to
dismiss them.
'2. All public officials are servants of the whole community and not of any group
thereof.
'3. Universal adult suffrage is guaranteed with regard to the election of public
officials.
'4. In all elections, secrecy of the ballot shall not be violated. A voter shall not be
answerable, publicly or privately for the choice he has made.'
'Article 44· The qualifications of members of both Houses and their electors shall be
fixed by law. However, there shall be no discrimination because of race, creed, sex, social
status, family origin, education, property or income.' Itoh and Beer, Constitutional Case
Law of Japan, pp. 258-g, 261.
115
Law 63 of I975 added twenty seats to the House of Representatives, and created
new election districts in Tokyo, Chiba, Saitama, and Kanagawa, areas severely afflicted
with malapportionment.
116
Hanrei JihO 902 (November 2 I, 1978): 24-34 (Tokyo high court, September I I,
I978).
117
Koshiyama v. Election Commission, Hanrei Ji!W 902 (November 21, I978): 34-51
(Tokyo high court, September 13, I978).
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house election was held. 118 The apportionment as of the I979 elections
was challenged, and the apportionment as of the subsequentjune 22,
I98o elections is also expected to be challenged. Some LDP leaders have
expressed their disagreement with the 'one man-one vote' thinking
behind the I976 and I978 judgments of unconstitutionality and the
repeated challenges; but opposition politicians also see a threat to their
political positions in change. 119 In September I 978, the apportionment
caused discrepancies in the effective weight of a vote, depending on
election district, ranging up to 3· 74 to I in the lower house and 5·3 I to I
in the upper house, with I representing the minimum weight. 120 The
interplay of the Supreme Court and the Diet on the malapportionment
issue will merit close attention in the I 98os.
In addition, a November I979 district court decision raised the
spectre of japan's imperial past in sentencing two radicals to death for
killing eight and injuring close to 200 people in a series of bombings
between I972 and I975, and for plotting the assassination of the
Emperor. Although neither law nor constitution recognizes any difference between attempted murder of the Emperor and of an ordinary
citizen, the presiding judge raised political hackles by suggesting, to
many, a basic difference in holding the conspirators 'had a firm intent to
assassinate the Emperor, the symbol of the unity of the people ofjapan,
with bombs.' 121
On balance, however, despite political and judicial problems, the
second modern constitutional revolution ofjapan is likely to be guarded
with vigilance by substantial forces in the public and private sectors. In
Bonn, Matsuyama Yukio, international journalist with the Asahi
Shinbun, put well the hopes of many Japanese: 122
We want to be peaceful, and we want to remind you that japan is next to none
in her love of freedom, after having enjoyed its sweetness in these recent years.
·And we will not have it taken away by any government of any form. I still
remember being deeply impressed with President Kennedy's remarks on his
visit to the Berlin Wall, when he said, 'Ich bin ein Berliner.' He meant, of course,
118

Asahi Shinbun, September 7, 12, 13, 14, 17, and October 30, 1978.
Asahi Shinbun, September 27, 1978.
120
Sources cited supra, n. 118.
121
Tokyo district court, November 13, 1979; Asahi Shinbun, November 13 (evening
edn) and 14, 1979; The Japan Times, November 16, 1979. On the face of it, the judge was
merely stating a fact and quoting the constitution, but the fact that it was made into an
incident is another example of the supersensitivity, among many opposition politicians
and opinion purveyors, of the issue of the Emperor.
122
Yukio Matsuyama, 'What Has Been Changing in Japanese Politics and What
Not?,' unpublished speech, Trilateral Commission, Bonn, West Germany, October 23,
1977, pp. g-1o.
119
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that he was a free man, dedicated to liberty. And I still remember being deeply
impressed by Martin Luther King, when he raised a vision for all mankind and
said, 'I have a dream.' For man to be free and at peace with his neighbors.
/have a dream that the day will come when I shall be able to say to the world at
large, 'Ich bin ein Japaner.' And the world will know that such is a man who tries
to keep his liberty through peaceful means.

I share those hopes for Japan, and believe that constitutional
democracy will probably continue without further constitutional
revolution, barring a severe economic dislocation, the resurgence of
extreme nationalism, or a holocaust. The reasons for optimism in 1 g8o
are that competing constitutional structures and some values of
Japanese law and society give substance to such hopes, and that the
balance of political forces for and against stable Japanese-style democracy seems more likely to weigh increasingly on the side of responsible
freedom.
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